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"Out, Out Brief Candle": Constitutionally
Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally
Ill
By THOMAS J. MARZEN*
Introduction
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time ...
Out, out, brief candle!'
The debate over when, if ever, assisted suicide or consensual
homicide2 should be permitted by law usually proceeds in a set pat-
* B.A., University of Illinois; J.D., Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent
College of Law; General Counsel, National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent and
Disabled. The author thanks National Legal Center attorneys Daniel Avila, John Al-
tomare, and Jane Brockmann for their research assistance.
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5, 11. 19-21, 23 (Kenneth Muir ed.,
Methuen & Co. Ltd 1984) (1951).
2. Here, "assisted suicide" means intentionally aiding or abetting another to commit
suicide by an act, such as providing the other drugs or a weapon with knowledge that the
other will use the means provided to commit self-killing, see, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws
§ 752.1027(1) (1993). "Consensual homicide" or homicide-by-consent means intentionally
causing the death of another with the other's consent, such as shooting a gun at or injecting
lethal drugs into the other at the other's request. Direct homicide-by-consent or euthana-
sia is generally condemned on the principle, that consent is not a defense to homicide. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusrnN W. Sco-rT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 5.11, at 477 (2d ed. 1986).
Although the two concepts are different, they are often confused in the present debate
over assisted suicide, hastening death, and mercy killing. Thus, for example, the definitions
of permissible conduct sanctioned by typical proposals for legislation allowing physician-
assisted suicide conflate both concepts by defining "aid-in-dying" as "a medical procedure,
or action, that will terminate the life of the qualified patient in a painless, humane and
dignified manner whether administered by the physician at the patient's choice or direction
or whether the physician provides means to the patient for self-administration." DEREK
HUMPHRY, LAWFUL Exrr 136 (1993) (proposing a uniform model act).
The confusion in policy debate, however, underscores serious considerations in recog-
nizing any form of assisted suicide as a right. First, the social, personal, and state interests
and liberty interests at stake in assisted suicide and consensual homicide are identical un-
less there is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between self-killing with the aid of
another and killing by another with consent. For example, if only assisted suicide is
deemed a right, then a physician who intentionally provides a lethal dose to a patient is
constitutionally immune, while a physician who administers the same dose is guilty of mur-
[799]
800 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 21.799
tern. Proponents seek to carve out by statute or constitutional rule a
narrow exception to criminal prohibitions on homicide and assisted
suicide-generally, to permit "aid-in-dying" 3 by a physician for a com-
petent adult who has a "terminal condition" or "unbearable suffer-
ing."4 Opponents argue that there is no principled way to limit such
an exception in logic or in law because there is no defensible foothold
on this slippery slope' and hence, that it instead amounts to a
precipice.6
The slippery-slope argument is that it is unclear how social policy
or constitutional precedent would limit a recognized "liberty" to as-
sisted suicide or consensual homicide to such a narrow category.7
There is no discernable reason to limit sanctioned assisted suicide to
those with terminal conditions-who, after all, are supposed to die in
the near, foreseeable future-when those with non-terminal difficul-
ties or disabilities might have to endure greater "unbearable suffer-
ing" for much longer periods of time. Thus, if a ban on assisted
suicide imposes an "undue burden" on a supposed liberty interest in
suicide, then those with long-term problems have a greater claim on
the free exercise of this liberty than those with terminal conditions.
Moreover, it makes no sense to carve out an exception for only com-
petent adults since children and those with emotional, mental, or psy-
chological disabilities might also have terminal conditions and suffer
der, notwithstanding the consent of the patient in both cases. Second, even assuming that
any such distinction can be drawn or makes constitutional sense, it generates the obvious
prospect that, as a matter of constitutional doctrine, a defense of "assisted suicide" might
be raised in any prosecution for homicide. Moreover, intentional homicides could be
planned so as to provide for such a defense. This potential impediment to successful prose-
cution of intentional homicide alone forms a rational basis for a blanket ban on legal as-
sisted suicide in service to a state's interest in protection of human life. Indeed, this
concern might well have formed the basis for earlier court decisions rejecting assisted sui-
cide as a defense to prosection for homicide. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690,
693 (Mich. 1920).
3. See discussion supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, HAS-
TINGs CTR. REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 21, 25.
5. See Yale Kamisar, When is There a Constitutional "Right to Die"? When is There
No Constitutional "Right to Live"?, 25 GA. L. REv. 1203 (1991); Yale Kamisar, Some Non-
Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation, 42 MN. L. REv. 969
(1958); James Bopp, Jr., Is Assisted Suicide Constitutionally Protected?, 3 IssUEs IN LAW &
MED. 113, 139-40 (1987); see also Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Uncon-
stitutional?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1993, at 32, 34.
6. See, e.g., Walter M. Weber, A Cliff, Not a Slope: A Response to Margaret P. Battin,
18 SuIcIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 194 (1988).
7. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1,100-
107 (1985).
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unbearably, perhaps all the more because they cannot fully compre-
hend their fates or afflictions.
Proponents of a constitutional right to assisted suicide as well as
at least three trial courts8 have relied upon abortion and "right to die"
cases as precedents that provide sufficient evidence of the inherently
expansive nature of this liberty. Once recognized as a "right to pri-
vacy" 9 possessed by competent adults (and now treated as a "liberty
interest"),10 the abortion right was quickly extended to "mature" mi-
nors and granted to "immature" minors on "best interest" grounds."
Similarly, "right to die" caselaw initially concerned competent adults
and their right to refuse medical care; now these cases often involve
the issue of whether treatment or care might be withheld or with-
drawn from incapacitated persons whose wishes are unknown or un-
knowable.12 The right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is preserved
by imputing to such persons a "best interest" decision or "substituted
judgment" made by a third-party to reject treatment.'3
Proponents of a narrow exception for assisted suicide thus bear
the heavy, burden of discounting the "slippery slope" argument. The
logic and progression of the very precedents they rely upon in fact
rather obviously predict the argument's shape. Moreover, the con-
8. Hobbins v. Attorney General, No. 93-306-178-CZ (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County
May 20, 1993), appeal docketed, No. 164963 (Mich. App. Aug. 13, 1993); People v. Kevor-
kian, No. 93-11482 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County Dec. 13, 1993), appeal docketed, No.
171056 (Mich. App. Dec. 21, 1993); People v. Kevorkian, No. CR-92-115190-FC (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Oakland County July 21,1992), appeal docketed, No. 154740 (Mich. App. Nov. 6, 1992).
Oral arguments were heard in all three cases on January 6, 1994.
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
10. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (plurality opinion).
11. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct.
2926, 2972 (1990).
12. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp., 575 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. N.Y. 1983),
affd on other grounds, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A
(Monroe County Cir. Ct. Apr. 12, 1983), petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition
denied sub nom. State ex rel. Infant Doe v. Monroe Cir. Ct., No. 482 S 140 (Ind. Apr. 14,
1982), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Infant Doe, No. 1-782A-157 (Ind. June 15, 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 394 (1983) (the Monroe Circuit court opinion is printed as an appen-
dix to HUMAN LIFE AND HEALTH CARE ETHICS 313-16 (James Bopp, Jr. ed. 1985));
Brophy v. New Eng. Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub. nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990). For an extensive survey of the relevant case law, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR
STATE CouRTs, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SuSTAINING
MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 155-79 (apps. A & B) (2d ed. 1992); see also ALAN MEISEL,
TnE RIOHT To DIE Parts III & V (1989 & Supp. No. 2 1993).
13. See supra note 12.
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temporary record of the Netherlands, the only nation legally enter-
taining euthanasia practices, testifies to its reality. 4
Nevertheless, proponents of constitutionally legalized assisted su-
icide have asked the courts to confront the "hard case" (or the
"camel's nose") posed by the desire of a competent adult with a termi-
nal condition or "unbearable suffering" who wishes to commit suicide
by ingesting a lethal dose of drugs prescribed by a physician with
knowledge that this is what the patient will do."5 Surely, they imply,
in this case, the asserted liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, or under similar provisions in state
constitutions, outweighs any asserted countervailing state interest in
preventing the person from committing suicide or the physician from
supplying the means. They urge the courts to put aside the social and
constitutional consequences of accepting any such "liberty": consider
this case sui generis, then let the precedential chips fall where they
may.' 6
It would, however, be a constitutional oddity were the courts to
acknowledge a liberty interest deemed so compelling as to warrant
striking down an interfering state statute, but so narrow in scope that
14. Each year in the Netherlands, thousands of nonvoluntary cases of euthanasia take
place despite explicit statutory prohibitions, see Richard Fenigsen, The Netherlands: New
Regulations Concerning Euthanasia, 9 IssuEs IN LAW & MED. 167,169-71 (1993); see id. at
170, and text accompanying notes 15-18, for declarations by government officials permit-
ting de facto nonvoluntary euthanasia with impunity; see also Johannes J.M. van Delden et
al., The Remmelink Study: Two Years Later, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 24-
25; CARLOS F. GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS 64, 85 ("Case 22"), 104-113, 120, 133-34 (1991); Leon R. Kass, Is There A
Right to Die?, 23 HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 34,37 (note 2 and accompanying
text).
In addition to incompetent and never-competent adolescents and adults, newborns
and infants with disabilities are fast becoming the most vulnerable classes of persons sub-
ject to nonvoluntary euthanasia, see generally Cor Spreeuwenberg, The Story of Laurens,
in 2 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICs 201, 261-63 (1993):
I concur that autonomy ought to be the point of departure in euthanasia deci-
sions, but it should not be the only principle considered. Because newborns can-
not exercise autonomy does not mean that they should be denied beneficence
[medically caused death]. There are many less important decisions we make in
their behalf, why should they be denied perhaps the most caring choice of all?
Id. at 262.
The Canadian Supreme Court commented on the Dutch experiment in its recent deci-
sion upholding Canada's ban on assisted suicide: "This worrisome trend supports the view
that a relaxation of the absolute prohibition takes us down 'the slippery slope."' Rodri-
guez v. Attorney Gen. of Can. No. 23476, slip op. at 29 (Can. Sept. 30, 1993) (Sopinka, I.,
writing for the majority).
15. See, e.g., Sedler, supra note 4, at 22-23.
16. Id.
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it can only be freely exercised in such limited circumstances. 17 It
would be rather like acknowledging that the Constitution protects
freedom of speech, but only by certain qualified adults with a proven,
urgent need to orate and only with the assistance of some guardian of
speech licensed by the state.
Moreover, a judiciary that did not consider what sort of conse-
quences might flow, legal and otherwise, from recognizing a right to
assisted suicide would neither be responsible nor reflect a coherent
vision of its obligations in the constitutional and social order. Law
may proceed on a case-by-case basis in the courts, but common law
trends and especially constitutional developments necessarily incorpo-
rate broad principles with potential applications in other contexts.
This Article argues that assisted suicide as a fundamental consti-
tutional right lacks support in a number of areas. Initially, this Article
shows the asserted liberty interest in assisted suicide has no historical
basis and is not an implicit right under the Fourteenth Amendment's
"liberty" guarantee. Second, this Article examines the fallacy of
granting a constitutional liberty interest to assisted suicide solely to
"rational" adults, and the consequences therefrom. Next, this Article
argues the terms "terminal condition" and "unbearable suffering" are
too nebulous to provide any critical distinctions between those activi-
ties which are protected by the Constitution and those which are not.
Finally, awarding physicians the unique discretion to determine the
appropriateness of physician-assisted suicide, this Article argues, will
not further any legitimate state interests.
The "hard case" posed by proponents of assisted suicide should
be considered on its own merits, as this Article intends to do. Never-
theless, to affirm the proponents' position, the courts must almost cer-
tainly first affirm a "liberty" that cannot be easily circumscribed by
the narrow conditions that its proponents propose.
I. The Nature of the Asserted "Liberty"
The "liberty" claimed is said to permit those with terminal condi-
tions or unbearable suffering to receive physician assistance in directly
ending their lives by a prescribed, lethal drug overdose. 8 Nowhere in
the Constitution is such a right explicitly granted. Hence, proponents
17. Such a limited right could no more remain within its initial boundaries than the
right to vote could exist only as a right to be exercised by "literate" citizens. The shelf-life
of "rationality," "terminal condition," and "physician-only assistance," as limits on the pur-
ported right to suicide, would be far shorter than that of voter literacy tests.
18. Sedler, supra note 4, at 23.
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of such a liberty must argue that any such right or liberty is somehow
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. This claim has several
weaknesses.
A. A Right to Assisted Suicide has No Historical Basis
An implicit right to assisted suicide has no historical basis be-
cause, although suicide is no longer treated as a crime as it was at
common law,' 9 attempted suicide continues to be regarded as an indi-
cium of psychological disability or emotional disturbance that fully
justifies intervention by public authorities and private agents.2 That
suicide itself has been decriminalized by replacement of the common
law of crimes with statutes that fail to penalize it hardly demonstrates
that our society deems suicide to be an essential part of ordered lib-
erty. It demonstrates only that pity has replaced retribution as a so-
cially proper response to suicide and that a punitive model was
replaced by a therapeutic one in the law. Suicide is still a harm to be
avoided, not a right to be encouraged. Moreover, assisted suicide is
separately punishable by statute in thirty states.2' The purpose of
these laws continues to be prevention and discouragement of suicide,
though the method and rationale may vary from the earlier laws.
19. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294-95 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
20. All fifty states provide for the temporary involuntary commitment of individuals
who are a danger to themselves, see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, §§ 5150, 5200, 5206,
5213, 5250(a), 5256.6, 5260 (West 1982); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.1401(a),
330.1468(2) (West 1992).
21. ALASKA STA. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (1989); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103(A)(3)
(1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West
1988); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-56(a)(2)
(West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West
1992); H.B. 819, 88th Ill. Gen. Assembly (signed by the Governor on Aug. 20, 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1983); MiCH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1993); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (West 1987); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (Supp. 1973); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1991); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 28-307 (1989); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15(3) (McKinney 1987);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 813, 814, 815 (West
1983); OR. REv. STAT. § 163.125(1)(B) (1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505(b) (1983);
S.D. CODiFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37 (1988); 1993 Tenn. Pub. Acts 405; TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.08 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.060 (West 1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 940.12 (West 1982).
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B. A Right to Assisted Suicide is Not Implicit in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause
The claim that there nevertheless exists an "implicit" constitu-
tional liberty or right to some form of assisted suicide therefore avoids
the necessity of proving an historical or even contemporary concrete
legal basis. Instead, this claim simply assumes that a right to suicide
and its step-child, assisted suicide, is somehow contained within the
concept of "liberty" envisioned by the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment or-if the framers had fully understood the true nature
of liberty-is one that they would surely have embraced. A particular
concept of personal autonomy that includes suicide and assisted sui-
cide would thus be grafted to constitutional roots that recognized
neither.
At least in cases of assisted suicide done by physician prescription
for those with terminal conditions or unbearable suffering, proponents
of this liberty hold that statutory prohibitions on assisted suicide strike
an unfair balance between state and individual interests. The propo-
nents' underlying theory here invokes the "balancing" approach de-
veloped in the abortion and "right to die" cases. It apparently
presupposes that virtually anything one wants to do is protected as a
"liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment, from killing oneself to
jaywalking-and that the sole rationale for restricting any conduct is
the counterbalance of some compelling or otherwise valid state inter-
est in limiting such conduct. At least in the cases of suicide and as-
sisted suicide, the.theory simply assumes that these are "liberties"
against which state interests must be balanced, although the historical
record demonstrates they are not explicitly protected liberties in the
first place. Moreover, asserting a "liberty" under the Constitution to
directly take one's own life based on precedents upholding abortion
or the rejection of unwanted treatment fails to recognize that neither
of these lines of cases concern the taking of a human life "born... in
the United States."22 A fetus is not yet born. And though surely
death may be a known consequence of rejection of medical treatment,
caselaw has been careful to characterize this outcome as the end result
of a natural process of the affected person's illness or injury, rather
than as the legally intended result of the rejection of treatment.23 In-
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
23. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (N.J. 1985) ("Refusing medical inter-
vention merely allows the disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to
occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of a
self-inflicted injury.").
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deed, the courts have often rejected a right to suicide or euthanasia in
the very process of affirming a right to refuse treatment,24 and legisla-
tures that have codified the right to refuse treatment in the same legis-
lation reject any affirmative act to end life.21
Furthermore, the balancing theory conflates the firm distinction
in the law between act (suicide, assisted suicide, and homicide-by-con-
sent) and omission (withholding and withdrawing treatment or care).
The cases sanctioning rejection of treatment are rooted in the rule that
any "unconsented touching" without legal justification is a battery,26 a
rule from the same common law that regarded suicide as a felony 7
24. See, e.g., DeGrella v. Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 706-07 (Ky. 1993) (stressing that
"'mercy killing' and 'euthanasia' or any other 'affirmative or deliberate act to end life' are
fundamental violations of the common law" as well as the state's living will law). The
distinction between the withdrawal of treatment and the acts of homicide, euthanasia, and
assisted suicide is also made in the seminal "right to die" case. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 670 (NJ. 1976). See also MEISEL, supra note 12, at 61-69, §§ 3.9 & 3.10.
25. Natural death/living will statutes: ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.12.080(f) (1992); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-3210 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
210(g) (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191.5(g) (West 1993); COLO. Rev.
STAT. § 15-18-112(1) (1989); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.309(1) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-4111(b) (1986); HAw. REv. STAT. § 327D-
13 (1992); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 755, 1 35/9(f) (Smith-Hurd 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 144A.11.6 (West 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28, 109 (1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 311.636 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 1299.58.10(a) (West 1992);
ME. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A § 5-711(g) (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN § 5-
610(3) (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145B.14 (West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-117(2)
(1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055(5) (Vernon 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-9-205(7)
(1991); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-412(7) (1992); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 449.670(2) (Michie
1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:10(II) (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(b) (1990);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01 (1991); OHIO Rev. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(d) (Anderson
1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.12(g) (West 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.645(1)
(1991); 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5402(b) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAws § 234.11-10(f) (1992);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-130 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-20
(1993); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.020 (West 1992); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 75-2-1118 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 70.122.100 (West 1993); W.VA. CODE § 16-30-10 (1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.11(6)
(West 1989); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-109 (1988).
Durable power of attorney for health care statutes: 63 Del. Laws, ch. 386, § 3 ("Noth-
ing in this act [authorizing durable powers of attorney for health care] shall be construed to
condone, authorize or approve of mercy-killing [or] be construed to permit any affirmative
or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying");
D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2212 (1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40150 (Smith-Hurd 1992);
IND. CODE ANN. § 30-5-5-17(b) (Bums 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144B.12.2 (West 1993);
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch. 201D, § 12 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 700.496(20) (West Supp. 1993); N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2989(3) (McKinney 1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-01 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.10-9(f) (1992); Wyo. STAT. § 3-5-
211 (1992).
26. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39-42
(5th ed. 1984)
27. Marzen, supra note 7, at 56-63.
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To invoke the right to reject treatment in support of a right to assisted
suicide thus betrays the original firm distinction drawn between re-
fusal of unwanted treatment and suicide.
C. Other Constitutional Inconsistencies
Assertion of an "implicit" constitutional "liberty" to take one's
own life and to receive assistance in doing so also fails to confront
separate rational and constitutional problems. Put aside the absurd-
ity of imputing to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment an in-
tent to recognize a "liberty" for the newly freed slaves to kill
themselves and to secure the assistance of others to do so. The Fram-
ers intended to protect the right to live, and the right to live is the
"right to have rights."'' But the claim that there is a right to suicide
assumes that there is an unstated superior right, which is a right to
have no rights at all. The concept of a "liberty" to kill oneself itself
thus contains an inner contradiction. And the idea of a "liberty" to
kill oneself with the assistance of another without state interference
amplifies the contradiction by extending it to the social order.
The plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment itself recog-
nizes in logical sequence that first "life" (not death) and then "lib-
erty," should be provided substantive, procedural, and equal
protection of the law.29 The notion that there exists a "liberty" to
seek and secure assistance to deprive oneself of the right to live that
the state is forbidden to deny by way of anti-assisted suicide laws in-
verts the order-rendering this liberty the master of life when, in fact,
life is the necessary prerequisite to any liberty.3" The affirmative obli-
gation of the state to recognize, in the first instance, the right of its
citizens to live is thus transformed into an obligation to turn its back
on conduct knowingly intended to deprive citizens of life, and thus all
liberties-and this in the name of liberty. The "liberty" recognized by
the Constitution does not include a right to sell oneself to another into
slavery, thereby depriving oneself of liberty itself. Likewise, and for
nearly identical reasons, the Constitution should not properly be con-
strued in the name of liberty to recognize a right to seek and secure
assistance of another to end one's life, thereby depriving one of all
liberties.
28. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
29. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
30. For an expanded exposition of this argument, see Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Eutha-
nasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHm. & Pun. A-F. 93 (1978).
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Some assert that the constitution that protects the person's right
to assisted suicide "equally protects that person's right to choose not
to hasten inevitable death."31 One need not eschew a principle of in-
herent neutrality between choices for life and death, however, in or-
der to prefer decisions for continued life. This is so because the
Constitution itself is not neutral, affirming only an interest in "life,"
and placing interests in "liberty" then "property" in subsidiary order.
If liberty were conceived to subsume life,32 then an interest in "prop-
erty" might likewise be conceived to subsume both liberty and life.
Any claim that the Constitution ought properly to recognize a
right to assisted suicide necessarily assumes a recognized liberty to
suicide itself. Yet paradoxically, suicide is now nowhere a crime and,
in this sense, the state imposes no "burden" of any kind on completion
of the act. The plea for recognition of a right to assisted suicide thus
amounts to a plea for suicide of a special sort- suicide that is done with
expert aid and. instruction to assure its painless and certain
completion.
The Constitution may protect a right to "define one's own con-
cept of existence, 33 but the right to do so rests upon the assumption
that one exists in the first place. And even if in some sense this af-
firmative right includes its opposite-as though one might simply de-
fine one's self as a non-person who lacks existence-it is a step into
another dimension, to claim one also has the right to enlist others in
seeking a designer death.
"The choice between life and death" may be a "deeply personal
decision of obvious and overwhelming finality, 314 as the Supreme
Court described it (while holding that the state may require clear and
convincing evidence of patient intent to forego treatment in service to
31. Sedler, supra note 4, at 25.
32. Proponents seem to argue in the context of suicide that any choice that contem-
plates multiple outcomes of philosophical, legal, moral, and personal significance is by vir-
tue of the seriousness of these concerns a fundamental constitutional right. Thus, in People
v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, slip op. at 26 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County Dec. 13, 1993),
Judge Kaufman asserted that "the decision to commit suicide involves an intimate and
personal choice, and given the nature of the decision certainly ranks among the most im-
portant that a person may make concerning one's own being." This argument includes,
however, a non-sequitur. Similarly important would be personal decisions to cut off one's
arm or leg or to mutilate one's face, but these decisions are not protected liberty rights
under the Constitution. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that sod-
omy is not a protected liberty interest). That a choice may be personally significant or of
concern to philosophers, lawyers, and moralists tells us nothing about its constitutional
weight.
33. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992) (plurality opinion).
34. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
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an "unqualified interest" in the preservation of life).35 Perhaps such a
choice has a valid constitutional dimension in the context of a decision
to reject the initiation or continuation of invasive life-sustaining care.
But it is another thing altogether to claim that this choice includes a
right to death-causing invasive means, and more: that this supposed
right is broad enough to encompass a right to secure the services of
others to effect such a purpose, as though either the Constitution or
the state must sanction commerce in self-killing.
H. The "Rational" Competent Adult
Assuming there exists some constitutionally cognizable liberty in-
terest in suicide or assisted suicide, proponents assert that this right
might only be exercised by competent adults. The apparent rationale
for this is that only competent adults should be deemed capable of
"rational suicide," which is the conduct to be protected. Thus, for ex-
ample, the trial court in People v. Kevorkian36 found that there is a
constitutional right to "rational" suicide, but held that the state has a
compelling interest in preventing "irrational" suicide.37 There are, as
the court stated, "circumstances where a person's decision to end their
life, and the attempted execution of that decision, are not constitu-
tionally protected, and could be proscribed by the state."3 According
to the court,
the two easiest examples are attempted suicide by a child or in-
competent person who suffers from no objective debilitating
physical illness. These types of suicides would probably be
placed at one end of the continuum labeled irrational suicide.
At the other end of the continuum, labeled rational suicide,
would be the suicide of a competent adult who has an objec-
tively verifiable terminal illness and who, as a result of that ter-
minal illness, suffers from significant, substantial, and
continuous agony, and objective medical analysis confirms that
any alleviation of this discomfort is extremely unlikely prior to
death.39
The inquiry into whether or not suicide is "rational" is thus inextrica-
bly bound not only to competence, but also to certain verifiable condi-
tions-conditions that the Constitution itself supposedly deems as
justifiable or "rational" prerequisites to claiming an exception to an
otherwise blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.
35. Id.
36. No. 93-11482, slip op. at 34 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Wayne County Dec. 13, 1993).
37. Id. at 34.
38. Id. at 32.
39. Id. at 33.
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The requirement that certain conditions be met before suicide/
assisted suicide is deemed "rational" presumes to judge on constitu-
tional grounds what are and what are not "good reasons" to kill one-
self. The Kevorkian court, for example, assumes that at least its
parade of horribles forms a "good reason," but it is utterly unclear
why these or any other horribles should form a special basis upon
which to assert an interest in "rational" suicide. Why not, for exam-
ple-to paraphrase the Kevorkian court-also justify suicide as "ra-
tional" based on quality of financial life, when one has "an objectively
verifiable... [dismal financial condition leading to bankruptcy] and
who, as a result of that terminal [financial] condition, suffers from sig-
nificant, substantial, and continuous agony, and objective... [finan-
cial] analysis confirms that any alleviation of this discomfort is
unlikely prior to death?"'4
Indeed, a better case could be made for one in a "terminal" finan-
cial condition than for one with a terminal medical condition since the
perpetually impoverished who continue to survive would be a burden
on the state, while those with terminal conditions must soon die in any
case. The Kevorkian court implied as much by citing in support of its
holding Buck v. Bell,4' a case which upheld state eugenic sterilization
laws precisely on the basis of the potential burden on the state im-
posed by future generations of supposed "imbeciles":
Although some cases have suggested that the state interest in
preserving life should be blind to the quality of life, a number of
cases suggest that the state's interest in preserving life does have
a qualitative component.... More to the point is Buck v. Bell.
In that case, the United States Supreme Court upheld a state
statute that required the sterilization of certain women. The
Court found that the state in that case had a sufficient interest to
avoid the creation of certain life because the state concluded the
quality of such life was too low and too much of a burden on
society to permit. As a result of this decision of the United
States Supreme Court, one could fairly ask, if the state is al-
lowed to prevent the creation of life because it deems the result-
ing quality too low, how can it deprive a person of the right,
40. Id. "Contemporary advocates [of rationale suicide] see a close analogy between a
rational decision for suicide and the decision of the directors of a firm to declare bank-
ruptcy and go out of business." Herbert Hendin, Seduced by Death: Doctors, Patients and
the Dutch Cure, 10 IssuEs IN LAw & MED. (forthcoming in 1994) (citing Roger Brandt,
The Morality and Rationality of Suicide in A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE 61
(Seymour Perlin ed. 1975).
41. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
Spring 1994] CONSTITUTIONALLY PRESCRIBED SUICIDE 811
under certain circumstances, to come to that same conclusion
with respect to their own life?4'
The dark side of this supposed bright liberty in assisted suicide is thus
exposed. The rationale for Buck v. Bell was bluntly stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court: "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind .... Three generations of imbeciles are
enough."43
The purportedly objective "quality of life" judgments to be made
in deciding who should live or die by way of assisted suicide are
deemed by the Kevorkian court to have much in common with judg-
ments made by the pre-World War II eugenics movement. Moreover,
Buck v. Bell involved compulsory sterilization, not sterilization freely
chosen. The specter is thus raised that if some "quality of life" criteria
can be settled upon that warrant voluntary assisted suicide, then the
same criteria could be used for other purposes. At the very least,
those who are deemed sufficiently unfit for blanket protection under
anti-assisted suicide statutes might also be consistently abandoned by
the state's social welfare programs and exempted from civil laws that
implicate any duty of care to sustain their lives or well-being.
In any case, linking a determination of what is "rational" to any
pre-established set of criteria places the cart before the horse-or
rather the horse within the cart. The Constitution does not place lim-
its on liberties based on whether it deems the person's reasons for a
personal choice to be valid or "rational," but permits limits to be
placed on the exercise of choices in the name of legitimate state inter-
ests. From this perspective, it does not matter whether or not a deci-
sion is "rational" because otherwise, for example, an "irrational"
homicide might be punished but a calculated "rational" murder could
not.
Moreover, it is known that the vast majority of persons who
choose to kill themselves-whether or not they have terminal condi-
tions-have emotional or psychological illnesses. 4 The data fully sup-
42. Kevorkian, slip op. at 27-28.
43. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (1927).
44. David C. Clark, "Rational" Suicide and People with Terminal Conditions or Disa-
bilities, 8 Issuts IN LAW & MED. 147, 153-55 (1992); Linda Ganzini et al., Depression,
Suicide, and the Right to Refiuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 4 J. CLIN. ETMICS 337, 338
(1993); Herbert Hendin & Gerald Klerman, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Dangers of
Legalization, 150 AM. J. PSyCmATRY 143, 143 (1993) ("Like other suicidal individuals,
patients who desire an early death during a terminal illness are usually suffering from a
treatable mental illness, most commonly a depressive condition.").
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port the presumption in the law that any decision to commit suicide
renders competency suspect.' But the idea that this suicide liberty
might be freely exercised by those with certain objective medical con-
ditions, but not by those without them, assumes without warrant, com-
petency in one case but not the other. This view thus implicitly
discounts any serious consideration of competency, apparently on the
invidious presumption that only people with such conditions are justi-
fied in wanting to kill themselves whether competent or not.
So unless the state is to abandon all suicidal persons, whether or
not driven to suicide by emotional or psychological illness, it must at
least sort out the competent from the incompetent in some fashion.
This raises the question of whether the state ought to be required to
engage in the investment necessary to harvest the few "true" exercises
of this liberty from the forest of those rooted in emotional or psycho-
logical distress or duress. But for the state or one of its agents, judicial
or otherwise, to act as a gatekeeper to select who should and who
should not be deemed sufficiently competent (or rational or terminal)
to die by way of assisted suicide raises obvious troubling questions
involving the administration of any such process. As the Kevorkian
court held, whatever the reasons offered by the person for assisted
suicide, the judiciary (or the legislature subject to judicial oversight)
would make the threshold decision based on its own "objective" crite-
ria.46 The prospect of dividing the sheep from the goats-those who
may die and those who may not-might properly be a role declined
based on a profoundly compelling state disinterest in such business.
If states may decline to create a process that might result in the
execution of criminals-fraught as it is with potential for mistake, er-
ror, coercion, and inequity-then why may they not simply refuse on
the same grounds to make any exception to a blanket prohibition on
assisted suicide that would require them to engage in a similar pro-
cess? The distinctions drawn by proponents of a limited right to as-
sisted suicide assume that some boundaries based on at least volitional
choice must be in place because, otherwise, many will die against their
45. The idea of rational suicide itself finds no clinical support. See Steven A. King,
Letter to the Editor, 271 JAMA 23 (1994). Dr. King criticizes an earlier article by Dr.
Timothy E. Quill which states that "'there is a growing clinical literature suggesting that
some of these suicides may be rational[.]"' Id. (quoting Timothy E. Quill, Doctor, I Want
to Die. Will You Help Me?, 270 JAMA 870 (1993)). Dr. King notes that Dr. Quill cited
only "editorials and commentaries, not clinical studies" to support his claim. Id. Dr. King
remarks that "[s]ince the issue being discussed involves the termination of life, a more solid
foundation supporting Quill's views would appear to be indicated." Id.
46. Kevorkian, slip op. at 32-35.
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wills-thereby denying them both their right to "life" and their "lib-
erty" interests in continued life. Based on the proponents' own as-
sumptions, therefore, opposing fundamental rights and interests are at
stake in any selection process, weaving an intricately tangled web of
substantive and due process issues of the highest order in which the
state and judiciary would necessarily be enmeshed.
Surely the states may decline to become death's arbitrators in
favor of maintaining a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide. The
Constitution by its plain language is ratcheted in favor of life, and it
should not be construed to require that the states or the courts must
select from among the population who is and who is not worthy of
their protection or interest. As a California appellate court recently
observed, while "it is conceivable to devise a judicial procedure to su-
pervise... assisted death[,] ... [w]e do not embark on such an enter-
prise because we hold that [individuals have] no constitutional right to
a state-assisted death."'47 The Canadian Supreme Court addressed
this same issue in its recent decision Rodriguez v. Attorney General of
Canada.4" In Rodriguez, a woman petitioned the Canadian courts for
authority to obtain suicide assistance. She challenged a Canadian fed-
eral law imposing a blanket ban on assisted suicide.49 She based her
petition on constitutional guarantees protecting "life, liberty and se-
curity of the person" found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.50 In upholding the ban, the high court observed that the
Canadian House of Lords had earlier rejected proposals to legalize
assisted suicide for competent, terminally ill persons "because ade-
quate guidelines to control abuse are difficult or impossible to de-
velop."'" The Court concluded that
The foregoing is also the answer to the submission that the im-
pugned legislation [banning assisted suicide] is overbroad.
There is no halfway measure that could be relied upon with as-
surance to fully achieve the legislation's purpose; first, because
the purpose extends to the protection of the life of the termi-
nally ill. Part of this purpose, as I have explained above, is to
discourage the terminally ill from choosing death over life. Sec-
ondly, even if the latter consideration can be stripped from the
legislative purpose, we have no assurance that the exception can
47. Donaldson v. Lungren, 2 Cal. App. 4th 1614, 1623 (1992) (denying injunctive relief
against prosecution to person with a brain tumor seeking cryogenic suspension).
48. No. 23476 (Can. Sept. 30, 1993).
49. See CRIMrNAL CODE, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 241 (1985) (Canada).
50. See CAN. CONST. pt. I, § 7.
51. Rodriguez, slip op. at 27 (Sopinka, J., writing for the majority).
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be made to limit the taking of life to those who are terminally ill
and genuinely desire death.5 2
The concern expressed here is not so much about a "slippery
slope" as it is about a "slippery rink." Its force lies not in contingent
fears of "sliding down the slope" to killing other populations or
groups beyond those with terminal conditions and unquestionable ra-
tionality. Rather, it arises from the difficulty of establishing within the
given parameters of the class of terminal, competent persons that any
one person seeking suicide is truly terminal and truly rational. It is
not the slope of its surface, but its utter lack of sure footing that cre-
ates the danger.
Hence, Canada's Supreme Court-the highest court in any nation
to have considered the matter, a court in the common law tradition,
and a court responsible for construing a constitution patterned after
our own-upheld Canada's complete statutory ban on assisted sui-
cide. The same considerations apply to American jurisprudence: The
Constitution ought not be construed to compel the state or the judici-
ary to engage in a selection process fraught with risk and based on
arbitrary criteria for what is and is not a "rational" suicide.
Ell. "Terminal Condition"
Recognizing some constitutional liberty interest in suicide, yet ac-
knowledging that there exists some state authority to regulate the
practice-that is, to place a "due" rather than "undue" burden on ex-
ercise of the liberty-presumes the existence of an identifiable class of
persons who might properly assert this narrowly tailored right. Propo-
nents of such a liberty argue that at least those who are "terminally
ill" form a "distinct and identifiable" class of those who will die
"within a relatively short period of time." 3
But there is, in fact, no consensus on what is a "terminal condi-
tion." This is testified to by the variety of definitions found in state
"living will" laws.54 Moreover, it is doubtful that a unitary definition
52. Id. at 44.
53. Sedler, supra note 4, at 22.
54. For a listing of state statutes defining "terminal condition," see MEISEL, supra note
12, at 359. These definitions vary in two crucial respects. First, the time-based criteria they
employ often differ, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 71860) (West Supp. 1992)
(death must occur in a "relatively short time"); COLO. REv. STAT. § 15-18-103(10) (1987 &
Supp. 1992) (treatment only "postpone[s] the moment of death"); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
2982 (Michie Supp. 1992) (death must be "imminent"). Second, the treatment-based crite-
ria they employ often differ as well, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(13) (1991 & Supp.
1992) (one has a terminal condition only if one will die "regardless" of the use of life-
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can be arrived at without arbitrary line-drawing that bears no relation
to discernible constitutional principle.55
Life itself is, after all, a terminal condition in the broadest sense.
In its narrowest sense, a terminal condition is only that which will re-
sult in the death of the person at a time unaffected by whether or not
the full medical armory is employed-that is, a condition for which all
treatment is useless to extend life even for a few moments, hours, or
days. The gulf between these two extremes is fluid, defying any at-
tempt to find firm ground between.
Is a condition "terminal" if one will die from it regardless of
whether or not treatment or care is provided? If this is the case, then
one is not terminal as long as any treatment is available that may pro-
vide continued survival-a respirator, resuscitation, chemotherapy, or
tube feeding. But if this concept of a "terminal condition" is adopted,
then it may be virtually impossible to ever honestly designate many
persons as "terminal" as long as tubes, machines, and drugs exist that
may sustain them. Yet it is the present specter of the use of such tech-
niques to sustain life indefinitely that drives the legislative impulse to
find the means, through "living wills" and otherwise, to sanction their
rejection.56
On the other hand, developing criteria to define the terminal con-
dition without reference to available, useful treatment is even more
unsatisfactory. For example, a person with diabetes or a serious infec-
tion might continue to survive with the use of insulin or antibiotics,
but will die without one or the other. A definition of "terminal condi-
tion" without reference to whether or not the lives of persons might
be maintained with treatment would render "terminal" these and all
others who rely on some form of treatment or care to survive-and,
hence, render them eligible for assisted suicide.
sustaining procedures); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Michie Supp. 1992) (one has a termi-
nal condition if one cannot recover from that condition).
The situation is further complicated because certain states include permanent or per-
sistent vegetative state and/or irreversible coma within their statutory definition of "termi-
nal condition." See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(17)(b) (West Supp. 1993); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(10) (West 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-403(11) (Supp. 1992);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.11-2(h) (Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Michie Supp.
1992). But see Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (patient in a persistent
vegetative state is not "terminally ill").
55. Any constitutionally-based definition of "terminal illness" would necessarily pre-
empt conflicting state definitions, overriding an arguable state prerogative to legislate in
this area.
56. C. Everett Koop & Edward Grant, The "Small Beginnings" of Euthanasia: Exam-
ining the Erosion in Legal Prohibitions Against Mercy-Killing, 2 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 585, 605-06 (1986).
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A time-based criterion may be introduced in some attempt to
limit the duration of survival (e.g., death will occur in a "relatively
short time") in an attempt to clarify the meaning of terminal condi-
tion. As it turns out, however, the addition of a time-based element
only complicates the problem. If quick death will result from failure
to employ medical treatment, then this simply means that those who
need treatment most urgently would be deemed terminal even if the
treatment would be entirely effective if it were provided. For exam-
ple, one might have a deadly infection-but an infection that might be
successfully treated with virtual certainty by use of available antibiot-
ics. Nevertheless, one would be "terminal" under such a time-based
definition.
On the other hand, a definition of terminal condition that in-
cludes both time-based and treatment-provided elements (e.g., that
death must occur even with treatment and within a relatively short
time) raises obvious questions about the nature of "treatment" and
the description of the time-based criterion.
It is assumed that the "treatment" involved is medical in nature,
but it is difficult to see why, from a constitutional perspective, this
should be so. The language of the Constitution itself provides no spe-
cial privileges to medical professionals and, in any case, life may be as
much threatened by lack of food, clothing, or shelter as by lack of
some form of specifically "medical" attention. A person who is hy-
pothermic or malnourished is "terminal" in a constitutionally indistin-
guishable sense from one who has a serious infection unless some
form of intervention-"treatment"-is provided, whether or not by a
physician. Certainly, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
would not have recognized such a distinction, when the only "treat-
ment" then available for most illnesses involved, at most, home nurs-
ing care that lacked even those remedies now available without
prescription.
A distinction between what is "medical treatment" and what is
not has arisen in court controversies involving food and fluids deliv-
ered directly to the stomach or intestine by way of a tube. Once desig-
nated a form of non-medical "care," as opposed to another form of
medical "treatment," intubation is now considered by the courts, at
least impliedly, to be subject to a special set of rules permitting it to be
withheld or withdrawn as any other form of medical treatment, rather
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than subject to rules that would seem to apply in non-medical cases
when use of tubes is not necessary to sustain life.57
It is true that the use of tubes usually involves a degree of bodily
intrusion in the sense that tubes penetrate the skin or orifices of the
body. It is not always the case, however, that this intervention involves
"touching" any more intrusive or expensive than ordinary nursing
care, or is any more technology-related than maintaining proper room
temperature, both of which are also necessary for a patient's survival.
Similarly, persons with some disabilities cannot secure sustenance
on their own or deliver it to themselves in the usual way. Is it "treat-
ment" to provide them a prescribed nutritional regimen or to spoon
feed them-and, if so, then what is the basis for denying suicide assist-
ance in these circumstances? Are such persons "terminal"-and
therefore eligible for assisted suicide-because they cannot them-
selves fulfill such major life functions? If not, then how is the inability
to walk to a grocery store or lift a spoon to the mouth constitutionally
distinguishable from the inability to swallow, to maintain heart func-
tions without a pacemaker, or to survive without a respirator?
Apart from the essentially artificial distinction between medical
attention and other forms of care necessary to sustain life, it is surely
not the case that those who might advocate an exception to the ban on
assisted suicide would find acceptable a rule that one must die within
a "relatively short time" even with treatment to be eligible for pre-
scribed suicide. This would mean, for example, that one who may be
sustained indefinitely on a respirator or with tube feeding would not
be "terminal"-and would probably not become so until they were so
mentally and physically disabled that they were themselves not able to
take the lethal drugs that a physician may prescribe. Thus, a person
with Alzheimer's or Lou Gehrig's disease, who might be "terminal" in
some sense-but not in a "short time"-would not be eligible for as-
sisted suicide until such time as she was unable because of mental or
physical disability to commit suicide by ingesting drugs or in any other
way.
Moreover, introduction of a time-based element itself creates
new problems. Consider a rule that a person must die within a "rela-
tively short time" to be deemed terminal. Use of the term "relatively"
begs the question: Relative to what? Immortality, indefinite life,
years, months, days, or hours? And what is a "short" time?5 8 On
57. See MEISEL, supra note 12, at § 5.10, and the cases cited therein.
58. For fuller discussion, see Thomas J. Marzen, The "Uniform Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act". A Critical Analysis, 1 IssuEs OF LAW & MED. 441, 465-68 (1986).
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what basis can one claim the Constitution as authority to make any
such distinction? Inherently vague and arbitrary criteria must neces-
sarily be built into any definition of "terminal condition" that employs
time-based elements, the fulfillment of which cannot in any case be
predicted with any exactitude. Moreover, any such time-based crite-
rion poses the prospect of permissive assisted suicide based solely on
the age of the person, since by advancing age alone one approaches
death. This entails by necessary implication the acceptance of an age-
based discrimination that more readily sanctions assisted suicide for
the old than the young.
In sum, the linchpin criterion of an existing "terminal condition"
that, it is argued, should warrant constitutionally sanctioned assisted
suicide turns out to contain its own "slippery slope," spanning from
life itself to a life that no amount of treatment can prolong for even a
moment. To select one place or the other as a bright line that renders
assisted suicide a crime on one side and a constitutionally protected
right on the other would simply be capricious.
If any line were drawn, human life by virtue of age and infirmity
must be deemed less worthy of state protection as a matter of consti-
tutional law. If this is so, then the state homicide codes logically must
be revised to acknowledge that homicide of the aged and infirmed is a
lesser crime-or no crime at all, if the person consents to the homi-
cide-than that of the young and the healthy.
Moreover, it is impossible to see why or how the Constitution
would concede a liberty interest in assisted suicide, yet grant no such
interest in the case of homicide-by-consent for those with terminal
conditions. That is, it makes no constitutional sense to distinguish be-
tween when a physician prescribes lethal drugs and when the physi-
cian administers them. The liberty interest in hastening inevitable
death is identical in both cases; the "burden" the state places on the
exercise of this supposed right by blanket prohibitions is the same.
The two might be distinguished by virtue that the person administers
the coup de grace to oneself in one case, while another person ad-
ministers it in the other. Yet such a distinction concedes the weight of
a social dimension that justifies the present state of the law, which
leaves suicide itself unpunished while punishing assisted suicide. Fur-
thermore, it deprives those unable because of disability to dispose of
themselves of the opportunity to ever exercise a "right" to suicide.
In the end, the assertion that a "terminal condition" warrants a
special exception for an asserted liberty interest in assisted suicide
seeks to ratify a certain view of life faced with the prospect of death.
Spring 19941 CONSTITUTIONALLY PRESCRIBED SUICIDE
Death by one's own hand is perceived, perhaps perversely, as a kind
of triumph over death itself, and aid is sought to assure this pyrrhic
victory.
No doubt, some may seek to deny death by embracing it. But the
Constitution does not protect the matchmaker.
IV. "Unbearable Suffering"
It is argued that when "unbearable suffering" occurs, special
force is lent to the claim that a ban on assisted suicide should be
deemed unconstitutional. No one doubts that human suffering exists
or that some might deem some forms of suffering 9 as "unbearable."6
But again, how can one carve out a constitutional niche that pretends
to have any reasonable boundaries for such criteria?
If the concept is described only to include physical pain, then the
reply is that almost all such pain can be abolished or alleviated
through use of analgesics 61-and can almost certainly be eliminated
with the use of anesthetics that render one unconscious, or nearly so.62
Proponents of a pain-based exception to a general ban on assisted sui-
cide might object to the latter method, claiming that suicide, rather
than anesthetics which compromise consciousness, is the preferred
means of alleviating pain and vindicating liberty. Yet such a response
would transform the claim for a pain-based exception into another
more far-reaching claim: that compromised consciousness resulting
from pain medication should also comprise an exception to an assisted
suicide ban. In the alternative, proponents might claim that the effi-
59. To "suffer" is defined as "1: to undergo or feel pain or distress .... 4: to endure
pain, disability, death, etc., patiently or willingly." RANDOM HOUSE DICrIONARY 1901 (2d
ed. 1987).
60. "Unbearable" is defined as "1: ... unendurable; intolerable." RANDOM HOUSE
DIcONARY 2503 (2d ed. 1987).
61. Martin L. Smith et al., A Good Death: Is Euthanasia the Answer?, 59 CLEVELAND
CLIN. J. MED. 99, 107 (1992) (citations omitted) ("[N]inety to ninety-nine percent of termi-
nal cancer pain can be controlled with the use of hospice and palliative care units.");
Michael H. Levy, Medical Management of Cancer Pain, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTIE OF
PAIN MANAGEmENT 235 (Carol A. Warfield, ed. 1993) (same); see also MEISEL, supra note
12, at 291. Even the Hemlock Society's staunch right-to-die advocate, Derek Humphry,
concedes that "[o]nly a small percentage of terminal physical pain cannot be controlled
today." DEREK HuMPHRY, LET ME DIE BEFORE I WAKE: HEMLOCK'S BOOK OF SELF-
DELIVERANCE FOR THE DYING 76 (1984).
62. John V. Hartline, Compassionate Alternatives for the Terminally Ill, MICH. MED.,
Apr. 1993, at 26, 27 ("Nevertheless, use of inadequate amounts of pain medication has
been implicated as the most significant form of 'drug abuse' in the care of the terminally
ill.") (reporting on a Michigan State Medical Society study of alternatives to assisted
suicide).
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cacy of methods available to alleviate or abolish pain should not be
taken into account in assessing what sort of pain should be present to
warrant an exception. The same sort of considerations apply to a
broader exception based on the apparent emotional and psychological
components involved in "suffering."'63 If physical and psychological
suffering is truly what proponents of assisted suicide so compassion-
ately wish to alleviate, why do they categorically reject less drastic
methods that might prove effective?'
Claims of "pain" and "suffering" have been viewed skeptically
enough in the tradition of civil law, and for the good reason that both
have inherently subjective natures.6 To qualify either or both by re-
quiring that they also be "unbearable," ostensibly limiting the scope of
an exception, in fact exponentially increases their subjectivity. Who is
to judge whether or what kind of pain or suffering is "unbearable" to
another person? Asking the judiciary to create such an exception to a
criminal law would invite it to fashion a garment sewn from scraps of
reason as clothing for a concept of liberty that will quickly burst its
seams. The Constitution warrants no such obligation.
V. Physician Assistance
However arbitrarily the class eligible to assist in suicide might be
described, most proponents describe the class eligible to assist as con-
sisting of only physicians.66 Even though physicians acknowledge a
duty to respect the wishes of competent patients, physicians as a class
reject any duty to participate in euthanasia, assisted suicide, or capital
punishment as utterly inconsistent with their mission to "do no
63. Tia Powell & Donald B. Kornfeld, On Promoting Rational Treatment, Not Rational
Suicide, 4 J. CLiN. ETHmcS 334, 334 (1993) ("Many health professionals fail to distinguish
between clinical depression and an appropriately sad reaction to a poor prognosis. Such
practioners give no thought to specific treatment for the patient's depression, thinking, 'I'd
be depressed, too!' However, it has been well documented that depression is a common
consequence of severe medical illness."). Another writer adds, "[t]he common tendency
for clinicians and laypersons to overlook the diagnosis of clinical depression when 'reasons'
for experiencing a depressed mood are present often leads to the omission of psychothera-
peutic and psychopharmacological treatment measures that might alleviate the severity of
a depressive illness, alleviate functional impairment, and reduce suicide risk," and con-
cludes that, "[t]he key problem is that stressful life events ... distract the evaluator from
recognizing the authenticity of a depressive illness. . . ." Clark, supra note 44 at 158-59
(citations omitted).
64. See supra notes 61, 63.
65. See generally FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 25.10 (2d ed.
1986).
66. See, e.g., HUMPHREY, supra note 2, at 133; Sedler, supra note 4, at 21.
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harm."'67 It is nevertheless presumed that physicians are especially
qualified to help end life in the name of mercy rather than retribu-
tion- indeed, that they are constitutionally empowered to do so.
Presumably, this professional requirement as an element of the right
to assist in suicide has several purposes. Physicians are well-educated,
respected members of society and are licensed by the state to care for
the lives and health of others. Their expert opinions should be and
are generally respected, and they are given some deferential weight by
the courts.68 Hence, it is implied that if a physician prescribes drugs
knowing that a patient with certain other qualifications will ingest
them and die as a result, then this should be especially deemed a con-
stitutionally protected form of assisted suicide. On the other hand, by
implication, if a friend provides the same drugs under the same cir-
cumstances-or worse, provides a gun with careful instructions on
how to assure a quick, painless death-then the Constitution might
properlypermit punishment of the friend.
Some might also claim that an intimate, long-term physician-pa-
tient relationship should be a prerequisite to assisted suicide6 9 or that
the aesthetics of a lethal overdose compared to a gunshot wound7"
should be considered. How the requisite degree of intimacy or a stan-
67. Initially, the AMA House of Delegates adopted a moderate policy against physi-
cian-assisted suicide, concluding that "the societal risks... [were] too great... to condone
... assisted suicide at this time." See Franklin G. Miller & John C. Fletcher, The Case for
Legalized Euthanasia, 36 PERSPS. IN BIOLOGY & MED. 159, 163-68 (1993) (discussing the
AMA's COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, DECISIONS NEAR THE END OF
LIFE (Report B) (1991)) (AMA policy against euthanasia and assisted suicide).
At its recent annual conference, however, the AMA House of Delegates adopted a
strengthened policy of "unqualified opposition" to physician assisted suicide because such
practice is "fundamentally inconsistent with the physician's professional role." See Brian
McCormick, Continued Opposition: House Refuses to Open Door on Physician-Assisted
Suicide, AM. MED. NEWS, Dec. 20, 1993, at 7; AMA Rejects Assisted Suicide, LIFE AT RISK,
Dec. 1993, at 2.
The AMA's position on physician participation in capital punishment is comparable.
See AMA's CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CURRENT OPn IONS, Op. 2.06 (1992) (policy
against capital punishment); Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Medical As-
sociation, Physician Participation in Capital Punishment, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1346-50
(1993); Brian McCormick, Ethics Panel Spells Out Physician Role in Executions, AM. MED.
NEWS, Dec. 28, 1992, at 6.
68. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECI-
SION MAKING IN Ln -SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 89-93 (2d ed. 1992).
69. Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill-Proposed Clinical Criteria for
Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1382 (1992); Howard Brody, As-
sisted Death-A Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1384 (1992).
70. See HtnrmY, supra note 61, at 58-59.
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dard for the aesthetics of suicide might be adduced from the Constitu-
tion is anyone's guess.
Reliance on a medical model to justify a newly created liberty for
assisted suicide closely tracks the abortion paradigm,71 where stated
medical data initially formed the basis to distinguish between first and
second trimester abortions based on relative risk of abortion and
childbirth to maternal life. This method permitted the state to require
abortion to be performed in a hospital in the latter, but not the for-
mer, period of pregnancy.72 Likewise, the determination of fetal via-
bility is left to the physician who might perform the abortion and
whose decision triggers whether or not the state might forbid the
abortion unless it was deemed necessary to preserve maternal life or
health7a-criteria broadly defined and also within the decisionmaking
authority of an attending physician.74 Indeed, the entire "zone of pri-
vacy" carved out to secure the abortion liberty exists only within the
boundary of physician practice and decisionmaking discretion: a non-
physician who performs an abortion may be punished as though the
abortion liberty was never recognized.75 By analogy, proponents of
physician assisted suicide apparently suggest that medical licensure
ought also to establish the outer boundaries of an asserted liberty in-
terest in assisted suicide.
Thus, suggested critical criteria that warrants assisted suicide-
existence of a "terminal condition" or "unbearable suffering"-would
turn upon medical expertise and discretion just as, in the context of
abortion, fetal viability and whether or not an abortion is "necessary"
to preserve maternal "health" turns on medical discretion. Moreover,
only physicians would be empowered to assist in suicide. All others
who did so could be punished since they would fall outside the consti-
tutionally protected "zone" this liberty provides.
The medical model was deemed crucial to the abortion right in
order to assure protection of maternal life and health during the
course of the abortion. Obviously, however, in the context of assisted
suicide the proposed medical model has nothing whatever to do with
preservation of patient life or health. To the contrary, physician in-
71. It also attempts to parallel, to some degree, the withholdingwithdrawing of treat-
ment cases, where reliance on medical testimony standards is often evident. See MmsEL,
supra note 12, at 156, § 6.10.
72. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
73. See id. at 163-64.
74. See id. at 165-66; Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1973).
75. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975).
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volvement is intended to assure that both life and the prospect of
health should end.
A. Potential State Interests in Physicians Assisting Suicide
The claim that only physicians should be involved in assisted sui-
cide thus assumes the existence of very different potential "state inter-
ests" to justify imposing burdens on the "liberty" to assisted suicide.
What might these be? Since no court has stated them, they can only
be inferred.
First, there is a potential state interest in assuring completed sui-
cide. Here, the physician is understood to be in full control of a pre-
scriptive armory of a kind and quantity that will assure avoidance of
an "incomplete" suicide, a feared potential consequence of an "unpro-
fessional" attempt. Perhaps the state has an interest in assuring the
death of criminals to be executed or foreign enemies in war, the only
other imaginable contexts in which such an interest is manifest. But
unless some state asserts an interest of this sort, it is impossible to see
how the courts can even consider its validity in the present context,
much less bestow on physicians a unique constitutional privilege to
pursue it.
Second, there is a potential state interest in assuring that death
will come in a "humane" and "dignified" fashion. Here, the physician
is understood to have the expertise to assure painless death and, pre-
sumably, that death will not result in a gruesome scene-a "back al-
ley" suicide. A patina of social respectability is also apparently added
by virtue of physician participation. Of course, physicians (unlike vet-
erinarians) have no special training in euthanasia and, at present, are
subject to professional sanctions if they practice it.76 Even so, physi-
cians undoubtedly know how to cause presumably painless death by
virtue of knowledge mastered on how to preserve life and alleviate
pain. The medical model presumes that at least some physicians will
be found willing to use and develop their expertise in such a fashion,
defying professional ethics in service to a blitzkrieg of advancing con-
stitutional doctrine. But again, no state has asserted such an interest
or empowered the medical profession to use its expertise in such a
way; there is no constitutional basis to bestow such a role on the medi-
cal profession.
Third, there is a potential state interest in physician involvement
as expert gatekeepers who would make the threshold determinations
76. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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that presumably justify assisted suicide: the presence of a competent
adult who has a "terminal condition" or "unbearable suffering." First,
competency is a legal, not medical determination;77 additionally, as-
signing this role to physicians assumes that "terminal condition" and
"unbearable suffering" have some constitutionally adduceable mean-
ings. If they do not, as has been argued here, then physicians may
ascribe any meaning to them that they please-and thus become both
architects and engineers, or judges and executioners, of the right to
assisted suicide. But even assuming that constitutionally-based defini-
tions of these terms can be stated, physicians would necessarily need
to be provided great latitude in interpreting them. In the absence of
such latitude, a "right to physician assisted suicide" would march on,
forever shadowed by potential imprisonment of the physician at every
step. Yet in the presence of such latitude, the compelling state interest
in the protection of human life and the explicit right to life of the
person under the Constitution both become playthings of physician
discretion.
The role of gatekeeper thus firmly sets the medical profession
painfully astride the very fence that it is supposed to guard. But while
placing the medical profession in such an awkward policy position as a
matter of constitutional law is one thing, placing patients in abject
doubt as to just what purpose-life or death-these professionals in
fact will serve is quite another. Any consolation that those few who
seek suicide may find medical professionals willing and able to ratify
and to assist in completion of such a purpose is easily outweighed by
the distrust and acute ambivalence engendered in the majority by as-
signing such a disparate role to an unwilling profession as a matter of
constitutional law.
B. The Contradictions in Physicians Being Constitutionally
Sanctioned to Provide Death
Consideration of never-asserted state interests in the face of a
speculative right to assisted suicide may seem remote, perhaps even
grotesque. But it is necessarily implicit in the claim that physicians
have a unique constitutional warrant to assist in suicide by virtue of
some special talent to assure certain, quick, and painless death. Ac-
ceptance of such a claim would be entailed were the courts seduced
into accepting the argument that physician assisted suicide is somehow
constitutionally different than hiring a contract killer or securing drugs
from a street-corer dealer to help accomplish the same purpose.
77. See In re Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Wash. 1984) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
824
Spring 19941 CONSTITUTIONALLY PRESCRIBED SUICIDE 825
At present, at least, the medical profession declines to assume the
mantle of either public or private executioner in service to "state in-
terests" in efficient and "humane" death. But even if the profession,
or some of its members, is or becomes inclined to do so, it would be
simply incredible to so construe the Constitution as to specifically per-
mit physicians to operate within a "zone of privacy" to cause death,
when the only reason to defer to the profession in the first place is its
mission to preserve life and health. It makes as much constitutional
sense to bestow a special prerogative on the medical profession to as-
sist in self-killing as it would to bestow the prerogative of the healer
on the military or the state executioner. In service to the constitu-
tional and state interests in life, the medical profession is, in fact, the
last class that ought to be granted such a privilege.
Of course, the sophisticated case for physician assisted suicide is
not now stated so forthrightly, but rather seeks to mask its premises
and necessary consequences. In particular, proponents of assisted sui-
cide seek to exploit the potential conflict between the physician's dual
roles of preserving life and providing relief from pain. They then im-
pute to the Constitution a value that favors relief of pain and suffering
over preservation of life, such that the physician who provides the for-
mer cannot be accused of failing to serve the latter when the two phy-
sician roles are in balance. Why one value should be so firmly placed
over the other is not explained. The presumption is apparently based
on the belief that a person is better off dead than in pain or suffering,
a notion the courts are expected to accept on judicial notice.
No concrete caselaw has been offered to support the hypothetical
fear that such a conflict has been realized in litigation. Beyond this,
however, the Constitution strikes no balance between interests in pain
relief and life-prolongation that would determine under what condi-
tions anti-assisted suicide statutes are legitimate exercises of state
authority.
Like pain relief, other medical purposes may be either used or
abused by the medical profession. For example, chemotherapy may
be used in attempt to cure cancer even with some other unintended
risks to life or health. But the same chemicals might be prescribed in
such amounts that they are known and intended to cause death. Pre-
sumably, even proponents of physician assisted suicide would disap-
prove of such a use of chemotherapy, even while they approve of the
use of analgesics to cause death. Yet, on what constitutionally dis-
cernable basis would this dichotomy rest? Moreover, there is no cog-
nizable difference between physician prescribed suicide on the pretext
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of pain relief and suicide by weapon provided by another on the pre-
text of self-defense. It is impossible to see why the Constitution grants
more or less latitude in one case or the other, unless it is presumed
that relief of pain somehow has greater constitutional value than pro-
tection of one's very life against an unjust aggressor.
Whatever constitutional warrant physicians may have by virtue of
service to state and constitutional interests in the preservation of
human life, the proposal to stretch this warrant to include its opposite,
which is efficient death, not only undercuts its rationale, but trans-
mutes the nature of the medical profession itself. By necessary impli-
cation, physicians would henceforth be deemed either killers or
curers, as the case may be, rather than those licensed only as guardi-
ans of material life-potentially guilty not only of the wrongful deaths
of those whose lives they negligently served, but also of the "wrongful
living" of those whose deaths they did not assure7 and the "wrongful
dying" of those whom they failed to dispatch in accord with some
death aesthetic. Such is the result that flows when the Constitution is
construed to pour the practice of death into the practice of medicine.
Conclusion
The claim that there ought to be a constitutionally recognized lib-
erty for physicians to "hasten inevitable death" by knowingly prescrib-
ing lethal drug doses for suicidal patients places its weight on a house
of cards. The categories relied upon to construct its case-"rational"
suicide, "terminal condition," "unbearable suffering," and physician
assistance-either have no constitutional foundation, cannot even be
described with any certainty, or both. Though perhaps the courts
have the power to impute to the Constitution such a rag-tag right, they
should at least recognize that to do so would be to accept the invita-
tion of its proponents to indulge in result-oriented jurisprudence of
the most transparent sort.
78. Cf. Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital., 614 N.E. 2d 841 (Ohio App. 1
Dist. 1992) (denying cause of action for "wrongful living" for person resuscitated contrary
to person's wishes).
